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Abstract 
This paper argues that security belongs to a specific category of commodities: “contested 
commodities” around which there is an ongoing and unsettled symbolic struggle over whether or 
not they can and should be though of as commodities (section 1). The contested nature of 
commodification has implications for how markets function; market practices tend to be defined 
and organized in ways that minimize their contentiousness and obfuscate their expansion. The paper 
looks at the implications of this argument for the conceptualization of the security. It focuses on the 
three central articulations of contestation: the discussion about whether the use of force can be left 
to the market, whether it can be so in the international realm and the discussion about whether or 
not markets trigger increased insecurity. It shows how this specific articulation of contestation has 
produced markets where the practice/definition of security is as public rather than private (section 
2), as inside rather than outside (section 3) and as a responsible reaction to a threat rather than as 
something contributing to the constitution of threats (section 4). Conceptualizations of private 
security consequently have to be devised to capture these practical consequences of contested 
commodification; they need to capture the private in the public, the inside in the outside and the 
securitizing in the response to threats.  
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Introduction 
The rapid expansion of a global market for private security/military services since the end of 
the cold war has triggered concern with the issue of how to understand the governance of 
private security generally and more specifically and instrumentally with how to regulate the 
divide between the public and the private (as indicated by this title of this workshop).1
More specifically, this paper argues that security belongs to a specific category of 
commodities: “contested commodities” around which there is an ongoing and unsettled 
symbolic struggle over whether or not they can and should be though of as commodities 
(section 1). The contested nature of commodification has implications for how markets 
function; market practices tend to be defined and organized in ways that minimize their 
contentiousness and obfuscate their expansion. The paper looks at the implications of this 
argument for the conceptualization of the security. It focuses on the three central articulations 
of contestation: the discussion about whether the use of force can be left to the market, 
whether it can be so in the international realm and the discussion about whether or not 
markets trigger increased insecurity. It shows how this specific articulation of contestation 
has produced markets where the practice/definition of security is as public rather than private 
(section 2), as inside rather than outside (section 3) and as a responsible reaction to a threat 
rather than as something contributing to the constitution of threats (section 4). 
Conceptualizations of private security consequently have to be devised to capture these 
practical consequences of contested commodification; they need to capture the private in the 
public, the inside in the outside and the securitizing in the response to threats. Efforts to draw 
 This 
concern is often articulated in terms of a need to draw “limits to the market” or defining 
“inherently public tasks”. This paper is a contribution to this discussion. More specifically, it 
makes the argument that the way we understand (or conceptualise) private security is critical 
to the prospect that the efforts to limits around acceptable market activities and/or to define 
inherently public tasks have of being effective (in the sense of filling the function they are 
intended for).  
                                                 
1 The general history of this expansion has been well covered elsewhere including e.g. Democratic Control over 
Armed Forces DCAF, “Private Military Companies,”  (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces, 2002), Peter W. Singer, Corporate Warriors. The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2003)., or  Anna Leander, Eroding State Authority? Private Military 
Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force (Rome: Centro Militare di Studi Strategici, 2006). An indication of 
the extent to which this has triggered a “mad scramble” to institute effective regulation and accountability can 
be gathered from a search in any database with law journals. See also Ian Kierpaul, “The Rush to Bring Private 
Military Contractors to Justice: The Mad Scramble of Congress, Lawyers, and Law Students after Abu Ghraib,” 
The University of Toledo Law Review 39 (2008). 
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limits around markets and define inherent state functions in other words need to break with 
conventional distinctions between inside/outside, public/private and security/threat. If they 
are to fill the function they are intended for, they have to be constructed through 
conceptualizations that reflect the extent to which the contested nature of private security 
makes it span these distinctions. 
 
Security as a contested commodity 
Not everything is a commodity to everyone. Although at one extreme economic theorists 
such as Gary Becker have argued that everything quite literally can be conceptualized as a 
commodity, economic anthropologists and legal/political theorists have persuasively 
underscored that the boundaries of commodification are contextual reflecting differences in 
social and moral political economies. The present context is marked by extensive 
commodification as amply problematized in contemporary social theory ranging from the 
Frankfurt school’s preoccupation with the “colonization of the life world by the system 
world” and “commodity fetishism” to Foucauldian concerns with neo-liberal 
governmentality. However, even in this context the commodification of certain goods and 
services—for example sex, body parts, and children—remains heavily contested. Many 
people simply refuse to accept that these things should be thought of as commodities with 
consequences for how markets operate and are organized. 
 “Contested commodities” are contested because there is fundamental 
disagreement about whether or not they are commodities in the first place. Some people think 
that they should not be thought of as things to be exchanged, bought and sold. The reasons 
obviously vary. It may be rooted in understandings of personhood as it is for Janet Radin—
from whom the concept of contested commodity is borrowed. She discusses the 
contemporary context and thinks that commodities become contested when they (for some 
people) are “personal” and not “fungible”; that is when some people consider something an 
inalienable part of their person that can not be given “exchange value” (i.e. that is not 
fungible). When this is the case, commodification will be strongly contested.2
                                                 
2 Margaret Jane Radin, Contested Commodities: The Trouble with Trade in Sex, Children, Body Parts and Other 
Things (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996).: 84. 
 Radin’s 
account focuses on some clear examples of this in the current context—namely the sale of 
sex, organs and children (through adoption and surrogate motherhood)—which some people 
think of as profoundly contestable because they involve inalienable parts of personhood.  
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Contestation may also be analyzed at a societal level as it is for example by Karl 
Polanyi. Polanyi does not talk of “contested” but of “fictitious” commodities. However, the 
basic idea is very similar. A central part of his critique of liberal thinking is that it fails to 
acknowledge the limits to commodification that cannot be extended too things that are too 
closely linked/intertwined with human livelihood and social organization; they are an 
inalienable part of the organization of society (no longer of the individual person). Attempts 
to do so creates “fictitious commodities” (labour, land and capital are the fictitious 
commodities Polanyi looks at in his work) and a “spontaneous counter movement” that is “at 
the origin of our times”, i.e. world war two and fascism.3
 That commodities are contested has important general implications for the 
organization of market practices. At the very basic it means that commodified and non-
commodified understandings of the same thing co-exist and shape market practices. In 
Radin’s terminology, this makes for an “incomplete commodification regime”. This 
complicates the prospect of providing easy answers to basic questions regarding the limits to 
the market. The limits are conceived of and practiced in a plurality of ways. But more than 
this, it wreaks havoc with “the market compartmentalization of traditional politics/ markets 
[that shapes contemporary thinking and practice and is theorized by e.g. Michael Walzer
 Whether for reasons linked to 
understandings of personhood or of society, the point is that the constitution of some things in 
some contexts as commodities is profoundly contested.  
4]… 
which becomes oversimplified at best… and worse... fails to give us a theoretical handle on 
how to evaluate these cultural crosscurrents”.5
To get such a “theoretical handle” it is important to develop a conceptualization which 
recognizes that commodification is not yet “normalized” or naturalized in the context but 
rather the object of an ongoing symbolic struggles over legitimate meaning—over whether or 
not a thing (e.g. sex, organs, children, land, labour, captial or security…) can and should be 
conceived of as a commodity.
  
6
                                                 
3 Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, 1st edition 1944 
ed. (Boston: Beacon Paperback, 1957). 
 It is also important to acknowledge that this struggle is bound 
to leave traces on the way that market practices are organized. Specifically, because the 
legitimacy of the market as such is questioned and under threat, market practices are bound to 
4 Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality (New York: Basic Books, 1983).. 
5 Radin, Contested Commodities.: xiii. 
6 For general notion of symbolic struggle here is used in Bourdieian fashion. For an elaboration see e.g. Pierre 
Bourdieu, Science De La Science Et Réflexivité. Cours Du Collège De France 2000-2001 (Paris: Raisons d’agir, 
2001) or Anna Leander, “Habitus and Field,” Blackwell: International Studies Compendium Project  (2009). 
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be organized in ways which diminishes the significance of this threat and makes the market 
appear as “normal” and uncontested as possible. 
Two kinds of mechanisms are therefore likely to be particularly salient for the 
organization of market practices. The first is the kind of mechanisms that minimize the 
salience of contesting commodification in the given context. The resentment of 
commodification rests on a certain number of contextually specific more or less articulated 
assumptions about what exactly it is about commodification that is disturbing. For example, 
the use of surrogate mothers may be contested because it is a way of forcing women to 
alienate their own bodies, perhaps because they do not have sufficient means of subsistence. 
To placate these concerns market actors are bound to react first of all by creating ways to 
ensure that women do this out of consent and perhaps even to deal with the subsistence 
argument by a combination of increasing the reward and limiting the context from which 
surrogate mother are drawn. To diminish contestation of an existing market, practices within 
it are in clear bound to be organized in ways that to the extent possible limit the salience of 
the objections that are raised against them. 
A second mechanism that is bound to become central to the organization of market 
practices as a consequence of the contestation of commodification is that which involves an 
obfuscation of the commodification process altering the context. The contestation of 
commodification makes the expansion of markets a particularly sensitive subject. Yet, at the 
same time markets have an inherent tendency to expand as market actors strive to innovate, 
improve, grow and capture new market shares. The consequence is “market imperialism” and 
“domino effects of markets.7 Contested commodification strains this process as it by 
definition implies that expansions will be seen as negative by some people. As a consequence 
there is a strong tendency to obfuscate market expansions, making them and the processes 
through which they take place invisible to the extent possible. Radin captures this nicely 
when she shows how references to broadly commonsensical values—such as 
entrepreneurship and free speech—obfuscates the role of these in further commodification.8
It may be important to underscore that the “symbolic struggles” and “mechanisms” 
just discussed are neither necessarily intentional nor explicitly conceived of as such. The 
tendency to naturalize, to decrease the salience of opposition and to obfuscate 
commodification processes in markets for contested commodities are not an expression of 
conspiratorial activities by which market actors consciously intended to marginalize 
 
                                                 
7 Walzer, Spheres of Justice. 
8Radin, Contested Commodities with regard to prostitution see 135-6 and for children 174-5. 
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contestation. It certainly cannot be excluded that market actors do conspire or devise reflected 
strategies to normalize and extend commodification.9 However, it is more likely that the 
centrality of the two mechanisms just discussed—minimization and obfuscation—are linked 
to the immediate and pragmatic concerns of those involved in the markets. Part of the 
persuasiveness of Polanyi’s account stems precisely from his ability to capture this; he 
analyses liberal thinkers and policy-makers as engaged in their own debates—not in some 
conspiratorial effort to extend “self-regulating markets”. He also masterfully shows the even 
if there is no conspiratorial intention, discourses do things: the liberals engaged in their own 
debates did expand commodify.10
Intentional or not, this section has shown that the contested nature of some 
commodities makes the “symbolic struggle” over whether or not they should be understood 
as commodities leave traces on the organization of the market. Mechanisms minimizing the 
salience of contestation and obfuscating further market expansion become particularly 
central. The remainder of the paper draws on this insight to highlight the implications for the 
conceptualization of a specific contested commodity: security. It does this by looking the 
three central articulations of the symbolic struggles over private security, showing for each of 
them how the symbolic struggle shape market practices in ways that makes minimization of 
salience and the obfuscation of expansion and suggesting ways in which the 
conceptualization of private security can account for this.  
 
Public Control/Enmeshed Practices 
Security is a strongly contested commodity essentially because providing it may involve the 
use of force and in particular decisions to kill or let live.11
 Indeed, the idea of public control/authority over the use of force is 
quintessential to modern political and social theory. Weber defines the state as the institution 
 For many matters of life and death 
cannot and should not be settled in markets and security, therefore, should not be equated to a 
commodity. For historical and contextual reasons the contestation of the commodification of 
security has crystallized around three issues. The first of these is the issue of the importance 
of public control (or perhaps better authority) over the use of force.  
                                                 
9 In fact, for the market for force some individuals and companies have demonstrably played a self-conscious in 
promoting commodification. This is the case of e.g. Tim Spicer (of Sandline, Trident Maritime and Aegis) who  
10 Consider his analysis of Bentham’s panopticon (for the imposition the commodification of labour) or of the 
Speenham Land Act (for the imposition of the commodification of land). 
11 For a fuller theoretical argument regarding why security specifically should be understood as acontested 
commodity see Montgomery Sapone, “I Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global Economy of 
Mercenary Violence,” California Western International Law Journal 30, no. fall (1999). 
7 
 
that can successfully claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. But Weber is far from 
the only thinker who has considered a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force as 
quintessential to the modern state. It is part of modern social and political theory. From 
Hobbes and Bodin onwards, the state control over the use of force has been seen as the 
answer to threats of generalized and uncontrolled violence in society. This is not to say that 
there has not been extensive awareness of the fact that this monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force is naively perceived as necessarily just and benevolent. Quite to the contrary, from 
Hobbes and onwards the potential for extreme injustice and violence on behalf of the 
Leviathan—and the importance of limiting it—has been a recurring subject of debate.12 Nor 
is this to say that there is no room for private actors or markets in the use of force. Rather, on 
the contrary as long as market actors act in conformity in with the way that the state has 
defined the legitimate use of force—i.e. within the realm defined by the state authority—
markets cause little concern.13
 The consequence is that market practices have become organized in ways that 
tend to mimimize the relevance of the objection that market developments are undermining 
the public control and authority over the use of force. Private market actors consequently 
insist that only rouge firms act in ways that challenge or is conceived of as opposed to states 
and to public regulation. This is articulated very consistently and as a central part of public 
statements on behalf of private companies. In individual and collective codes of conduct and 
ethics hence persistently emphasise the importance of conforming to laws (national and 
international), to the interests of their home states as well as the willingness to promote 
regulations and transparency. The British Association of Private Security Companies 
characteristically flags (the two first points on its webpage) that it is aimed “to build and 
promote open and transparent relations with UK Government departments and relevant 
International Organisations; and to promote compliance with UK values and interests and 
 This said, the widely accepted idea that a state monopoly on 
the legitimate use of force is important, central and positive has made it a logical focal point 
for contestations those who contest the commodification of security. 
                                                 
12 Amongst many see: Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 
M, Norbert Elias, “Civilization and Violence: On the State Monopoly of Physical Violence and Its 
Infringements,” Telos, no. 16 (1982), Wolfgang Sofsky, Traktat Über Die Gewalt (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer, 
1996). 
13 One way of illustrating this is through the emphasis placed on the fact that authority remains with the state 
when an issue become controversial. For example, in the case of the Blackwater involvement in the “CIA 
Killing Programs”, defenders of the controversial involvement insisted that the company only played a 
“mechanical” role, not involving “judgement” and that authority remained with the state republican senator 
Hoeckstra quoted in Andrea Mitchell, “Msnbc Interview with Representative Pete Hoekstra (R-Mi) About Cia 
Subcontracting Assasination Program,” in Federal News Service (2009). 
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with the laws of the countries in which its Members operate” “to promote compliance with 
UK values and interests and with the laws of the countries in which its Members operate”.14
Perhaps even more telling of the impact that the concern with leaving public 
control/authority intact has on market organization is the growth of a secondary consultancy 
industry aimed at assisting companies in the development of their codes of conduct and in 
ensuring their conformity to the law. We hence find companies (such as WBB consulting) 
promising to help companies conform with legislation and compose codes of conduct 
necessary for their operations “wherever this may be”.
 
Its charter then conjugates these aims in a variety of concrete ways.  
15
 Second, because contestation of the market tends to focus on the importance of 
public control and authority, market practices tend to be organized in ways that effectively 
obfuscates any expansions of the market. This is most clearly captured in the tendency of the 
private security market to be enmeshed within the state and to expand largely through this 
enmeshment. Individuals often have dual positions in the market and inside the private sector 
in ways which makes it very unclear that the market may in fact be expanding. It certainly is 
impossible to say it is expanding against states as it is largely within states. There is 
something of a conscious strategy of obfuscation of the extent to which markets play a role 
including from within states. Continental European states—that on average fail to 
acknowledge that they rely extensively on market actors and persistently proclaim that they 
think a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force is essential—are in fact more eager to 
set up public private partnerships than is the private sector.
 The market in clear defines itself 
and is organized in ways that minimize the salience of any critique that would interpret it as 
undermining public control/authority. 
16 But even when public-private-
partnerships are openly sought and encouraged, as they are in the US where they have 
arguably become part of a “new religion”,17
                                                 
14 BAPSC, “The British Association of Private Security Companies,”  http://www.bapsc.org.uk/ . Similar 
statements can be found in the IPOA code of conduct and on company websites. 
 they distract attention from the degree to which 
they encourage the growth of markets. The connotations of partnership and those of markets 
are quite distinct.  
15 www.wbbinc.com/laws-of-war-news.html  
16 Nicholas Dorn and Michael Levi, “Private-Public or Public-Private? Strategic Dialogue on Serious Crime and 
Terrorism in the EU,” Security Journal forthcoming (2007). 
17 Martha Minow, “Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion,” Harvard Law Review 
116, no. March (2003) and Paul Verkuil, Outsourcing Sovereignty: Why Privatization of Government Functions 
Threatens Democracy and What We Can Do About It (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
9 
 
Along similar lines, the role of markets is obfuscated in the language used to talk 
about the role of commercially employed individuals more generally. According to a high 
ranging National Intelligence Council official for example: “We don’t characterize it 
[outsourcing ] as outsourcing. That has a lot of negative connotations... Blackwater and the like. We 
term it ‘intelligence community associates’”.18 This is not only about language and connotations. 
It translates into ambiguous practices that keep the role of companies unclear and vague. An 
example of this is the role of Blackwater in the CIA retention and targeted assassination 
program, revealed by CIA director Leon Panetta in June 2009. Alvin Bernard Krongaard 
(formerly highly placed within the CIA) had moved to Blackwater in 2004 at which date part 
of the so called “Killing Program” was also outsourced to the company. Very little is known 
about the substantial role of Blackwater since there are no written documents and the 
arrangement was based on “informal agreements”.19
The centrality of public authority/control over the use of force hence plays an 
important role in shaping market practices. The concern to minimize salience makes the 
market practices unusually prone to affirm and conform to public control/authority and the 
need to obfuscate any possible contradiction and market expansion leads to an uncommon 
importance of “enmeshed” practices
  
20
 
; where the public and private are merged. For the 
conceptualization of private security (and for considering limits to markets/ inherent state 
tasks) this matters. If the conceptualization is to give a leverage to understand and regulate 
(and not merely serve to further obscure), it has to rest on a conception of markets 
acknowledging that market practices span the public-private divide; which conceives of the 
markets as being also inside states. 
Security Markets/Peacekeeping Practices 
A second point around which contestation of the commodification of security has been 
articulated is around the importance of state control of international uses of forces. Just as 
there has been an overwhelmingly strong consensus around the importance that states retain 
                                                 
18 Mathew Burrows, “Conference around the Report “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World”” (paper 
presented at the DIIS Public Conference, Copenhagen, 7 September 2009). 
19 For a fuller discussion and references see Anna Leander, “Risk and the Fabrication of Apolitical, 
Unaccountable Military Markets: The Case of the CIA “Killing Program”, Forthcoming  (2009).. 
20Anna Leander, “Securing Sovereignty by Governing Security through Markets,” in Sovereignty Games: 
Instrumentalising State Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond, ed. Rebbecca Adler-Nissen and Thomas 
Gammeltoft-Hansen (London: Palgrave, 2009). 
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their monopoly on the legitimate use of force, so has there been a strong commitment to the 
idea that this of particular importance in the international realm. 
Machiavelli’s critique of the “whores of war” has left profound traces in thinking 
about legitimate forms of soldiering and war. Even though mercenarism has of course played 
a key role historically, been widely relied upon and never eradicated (however, strong the 
claims to a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force), there has been a high degree of 
suspicion against the profession.21 This has suspicion has been articulated more strongly 
since the mid 19th Century when the uses of force internationally was nationalized and a 
series of national and international measures adopted to restrict mercenarism, privateering 
and piracy.22 Underlining the growing sense that mercenaries were not acceptable, they were 
explicitly excluded from protection under the Geneva Conventions. It is certainly fair to 
argue that although no strong and unitary law against mercenarism has developed the norm 
against mercenaries has been very strong.23 In fact, it may even understate the case. The term 
mercenary itself has become a negative and pejorative term. Using it is sufficient to cast a 
negative light on the market on commodification as visible in the extensive use of the term by 
those contesting commodification.24
In this context, it should come as no surprise that market practices are organized in 
ways that minimize the possibility of drawing links to mercenarism. In part this has taken the 
form of an explicit effort to ensure that the private security markets developed in the wake of 
the Cold War are distanced from traditional mercenarism. Companies, the professional 
associations tied to them, as well as self-selected advocates have gone to considerable lengths 
to explain that the current market is not simply mercenarism 2.0 and that the contemporary 
contractors are more like “messiahs than mercenaries”.
  
25
                                                 
21 Peter Cheney, “Iraq: A Legal Fronier,” Boston Globe, 18 April 2008, Oded Löwenheim, Predators and 
Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority (Ann Arbor: The University of 
Michigan Press, 2007). 
 The adoption of the Montreux 
22 Janice Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns: State-Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early 
Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
23 Sarah Percy, “Mercenaries: Strong Norm, Weak Law,” International Organization 61, no. 2 (2007).. 
24 The references here could be almost infinite in number but see e.g. E.L. Gaston, “Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise 
of the Modern Private Security Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement,” 
Harvard International Law Journal 49 (2008), War on Want, “Corporate Mercenaries,”  
http://www.waronwant.org/Corporate%20Mercenaries%2013275.twl , David J. Francis, “Mercenary 
Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?,” Third World 
Quarterly 20, no. 2 (1999), Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater: The Rise of the World’s Most Powerful Mercenary 
Army (Washington: Nation Books, 2007).. 
25 Doug Brooks, “Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services,” 
International Peacekeeping 7, no. 4 (2000), Gaston, “Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private 
Security Industry and Its Implications for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement.”. The references to this 
effect are numerous. This is just the titles cited. 
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document (an additional document relative to the Geneva conventions specifying state 
obligations when relying on private security contractors) and the evolving stance of the UN 
working group on mercenaries (that has been involved in redefining and rethinking its role in 
relation to private contractors) are clear indications of the effectiveness of this minimizing 
strategy.  
But more than this the pressure to avoid the “mercenary” connotation has pushed 
companies to define themselves as “security” rather than “military” companies. In a closed 
meeting one of the representatives of a major security contractor (with a long history in the 
sector) explained that in his view “since the closing of EO [Executive Outcomes closed in 
1998] here are no military companies; only security companies”. Companies, in logistics, 
consultancy, intelligence or training, of course advertise their contractual relationship to the 
armed forces. But they are logistics, intelligence... companies subcontracting to the armed 
forces. Companies selling guarding service and personal security including in the context of 
armed conflicts do not advertise themselves as selling “military” services but as providing 
“security services”. The need to miminize the possible links to mercenarism in clear places a 
strong pressure on market practices to be organized primarily as a security market tied 
directly to a national state as opposed to an international market. 
More than this, the need to distance the market from mercenarism creates a 
considerable degree of obfuscation of the link the military that is certainly a condition for the 
rapid expansion of the market; the market is linked to peace and democracy rather than to war 
and military. The strongest expression of this is no doubt in the (explicitly and publicly 
reflected upon26) Orwellian use of language by the US American interest group organization 
(with global ambitions and pretentions). The organization not only terms itself the 
International Peace Operations Association but it has also decided to consistently promote 
the wording “international peace and stability industry” to denote the international military 
industry and to link to consistently tie it to peace, human security, ethical behaviour and 
democracy. The preamble of the IPOA code of conduct for example states that: “This Code 
of Conduct seeks to ensure the ethical standards of IPOA member companies operating in 
conflict and post-conflict environments so that they may contribute their valuable services for 
the benefit of international peace and human security...”27
                                                 
26 J.J. Messner, “What’s in a Name? The Importance of Language for the Peace and Stability Operations 
Industry,” Journal of International Peace Operations 2, no. 6 (2007). 
 Even more strongly, companies 
often place emphasis on the extent to which they contribute to create peace and fill human 
27 IPOA, “Code of Conduct (Last Version Adopted February 2009),” available at www.ipoaworld.org  (2009). 
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security needs. Blackwater (now renamed Xe) for long ran a series of effective 
advertisements beginning “Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, Congo, Sudan, Iraq…” and ending 
“through selfless commitment and compassion for all people Blackwater works to make a 
difference in the world and provide hope to those who still live in desperate times”. Along 
similar lines EODT has run a simple advertising campaign with a picture of something like a 
refugee camp or an Asian or African child accompanied by the text “EODT supports 
humanitarian missions everywhere”. This linkage effectively obfuscates the ties between 
violence and war and the market and instead focuses attention on their humanitarian peace 
promoting function. 
The marketing and communication strategies of companies directed at potential clients 
(and especially at private companies) have a similarly obfuscating effect. In this 
communication, the emphasis is always placed on the capacity of the companies to cater for 
the security needs of their potential clients working in difficult environments. The French 
company SECOPEX for example tells its potential clients that : “Attentive aux besoins de ses 
clients, SECOPEX revendique une expertise et une expérience opérationnelles sur l’ensemble 
des cinq continents et s’appuie sur un vaste réseau de correspondants et de sociétés 
partenaires à l’international.”28 Similarly, the company Mission Essential promises its client 
to “provide certainty”. It can cover all kinds of issues—“our disciplines include training and 
advising, and world-wide mission support for language and culture, emerging markets, 
stability and reconstruction, specialized mission, and expeditionary operations” across the 
world—“we are a global company with over 4,000 people in 11 countries”.29
The articulation of the contestation of security commodification around its link to 
mercenarism directly fashions practices in the market. The need to minimize the relevance of 
the idea of mercenarism has pushed practices designed to define the market as one essentially 
about security and not military matters and in prolongation of this it has brought companies 
to define tie their operations to peace, stability and democracy in an effort to distract from the 
link to war. The consequence is that an adequate conceptualization of private security has to 
acknowledge the degree to which commodification spans but also links the military and 
 The flip side of 
this focus on the security needs of the clients is clearly to distract attention to the effect that 
providing this security has on the environment in which the services are provided and hence 
on the military like role that the companies take on and hence on the potential link that might 
be constituted to mercenarism. 
                                                 
28 http://www.secopex.com/index.php/a_propos  
29 http://www.missionep.com/index.xml  
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security as well as peace and war; it has to be sensitive to the degree to which the outside 
(military and war) is also present in the inside. Efforts to limit markets and define inherent 
state tasks consequently will need to depart from an acknowledgement of the blurred nature 
of the inside/outside distinction in the practices it is trying to capture and regulate.  
 
Selling Safety/Threat Constructing Practices 
The final and last point around which the contestation of the commodification of security has 
been articulated and which has consequently left an impact on the way that private security 
market has developed, is around the significance of potentially destabilizing effects of 
spiralling insecurity. 
 The idea of that insecurity tends to spiral comes in many versions. One classical 
rendering of this is captured by the notion of racketeering as used by organized criminal 
organizations. At the heart of this notion is a concern that those selling protection are in 
reality selling protection against threats that are a more or less direct consequence of their 
own activities and that these sales (and the market) increase (rather than decrease) the 
prevailing insecurity; a spiralling insecurity.30 The state claim to a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force has been explicitly tied to this idea.31 It has even been suggested a 
considerable “amnesia with regard to the genesis” of this monopoly is necessary to forget this 
as well as to overlook the continued violence of the state through its domination of symbolic 
systems and particularly through law.32 In international politics, the “security dilemma”—of 
having to prepare for war although one knows that this will trigger similar preparations on 
behalf of others—leads to a similar fear of spiralling insecurity: the markets increase the 
potential that states, but also non-state actors and “terrorists” in particular, can pose threats 
and may consequently induce conventional arms race.33
                                                 
30 For a substantial discussion of this process see Diego Gambetta, The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private 
Protection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
 A final version of this spiral 
argument comes from the constructivist contribution to the understanding of international 
security which emphasizes the centrality of “securitization” (that is of rendering something a 
31 Charles Tilly, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter 
Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 
32 Pierre Bourdieu, Raisons Pratiques: Sur La Théorie De L’action (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1994). for the 
formulation in terms of an amnesia of the genesis and Walter Benjamin, “Zur Kritik Der Gewalt,” Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, no. 47 (1920/1). for the argument about the violence of law. 
33 Dean C. Alexander, Business Confronts Terrorism: Risks and Responses (Madison: The University of 
Wisconsin Press, 2004), Jody Freeman and Martha Minow, Government by Contract: Outsourcing and 
American Democracy (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2009). 
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threat34). From this perspective the role of companies “selling” and hence advertising and 
lobbying for understanding specific issues as threats induces spirals of insecurity.35
The consequence of this articulation has been first that markets have been organized in 
ways that minimize the pertinence of critique to the effect that they may induce spirals of 
insecurity. This is articulated strongly in the recurring organization of market practices in 
ways that underscore that are in no way pushing or forcing their services onto clients. They 
are “responding to a demand”. It is the security needs (of states, organizations, private 
businesses and individuals) pre-existing and independent of they company they respond to. 
Private companies hence underscore their capacity to help clients assess and understand the 
risks and threats. Characteristically, the UK firm Olive Group hence defines it self as “a 
leading, global provider of integrated risk mitigation solutions to multinational corporations, 
governments, non-governmental organisations and private individuals”.
 These 
three figures of through where commodification of security is linked to spirals of insecurity is 
not intended to be exhaust the possible examples of how commodification is tied to 
insecurity. The intention is simply hint at the origins of the widespread articulation of the 
contestation around commodification around spirals of insecurity.  
36 Many companies 
—e.g. Background Asia Risk Solutions providing piracy protection—include the idea that 
they provide solutions in their name.37 More than this, to distance themselves from spirals of 
violence, companies profess to only answer the demand of “legitimate clients” and their 
codes of conduct make frequent reference to a wish not to alter political, military or social 
situations in the contexts of work.38
                                                 
34 For the original introduction of this notion see Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New 
Framework for Analysis (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner, 1998). A small truck load of commentary and 
discussions around it has since been developed in IR journals. 
 By hence defining the market as “responding” to the 
demands of (individual) legitimate clients, companies are effectively refusing an engagement 
with the question of whether their violence will lead to spirals of violence. They are solving 
problem for specific cases and often explicitly defer broader considerations to relevant public 
authorities. 
35 Anna Leander, “The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of Private Military 
Companies,” Millennium 33, no. 3 (2005), Anna Leander, “Privatizing the Politics of Protection: The Authority 
of Military Companies,” in The Politics of Protection: Sites of Insecurity and Political Agency, ed. Jef 
Huysmans, Andrew Dobson, and Raia Prohkovnik (London and New York: Routeldge, 2006), Anna Leander, 
“Regulating the Role of Pmcs in Shaping Security and Politics,” in From Mercenaries to Markets: The Rise and 
Regulation of Private Military Companies, ed. Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), Anna Leander, “Practices (Re)Producing Orders: Understanding the Role of Business 
in Global Security Governance,” in Business and Global Governance – Business in Global Governance ed. 
Morten Ougaard and Anna Leander (London: Routledge, 2009). 
36 http://www.olivegroup.com/index.htm  
37 http://www.piracysuppression.com/  
38 Viz. that of the BAPSC quoted in footnote 14. 
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 These organizational characteristics are effective in obfuscating the role of 
commodification in spiralling insecurity necessary for the expansion of the market. There is 
no reason to deny that the companies assess and suggest responses to security threats largely 
as response to a demand for them to do so—they are contacted and contracted for this 
purpose. However, it is naïve to think that that this in and of itself is not part of defining and 
constructing security needs: an assessment of security is the constitution of security. More 
than this, the security sector is not different from any other sector in the sense that companies 
market, advertise and lobby for their products. In the case of security that amounts to 
constructing (awareness of) insecurity. The rapid development of the sector is leading to the 
development of professional standards of various kinds which increases the effectiveness of 
this kind of insecurity construction: it can be formulated on the basis of technical expertise 
and professional knowledge and is hence difficult to counter. The consequence is a trend to 
broaden the boundaries of the security field, i.e. a very rapid market growth. Even if firms 
indeed do sell only to legitimate clients39, the concrete translation of this is that these clients 
will devote an increasing amount of their resources to security/military services and that the 
context will be increasingly focussed on military/security issues. The conflicts surrounding 
the “militarization” of humanitarianism, of development aid and of foreign policy are only 
some of the expressions of the resulting tensions.40
For conceptualization of private security the implication is that the extent to which the 
articulation of security commodification around its role in generating spirals of insecurity 
shapes market practices has to built in. As just argued this would entail integrating an 
awareness of the extent to which selling safety (in response to a demand) also amounts to 
selling (and thereby creating awareness of and willingness to act upon) threats. The 
conceptualization in other words has to account for the extent to which the selling safety also 
and simultaneously amounts to constructing threats. 
 Something one might reasonably call 
militarization/securitization is in other words obfuscated by the contestation of security 
commodification on the grounds that it produces spirals of violence.  
                                                 
39 They demonstrably do not. Moreover, this leaves aside the obvious point that who exactly is to be considered 
a legitimate client is far from straightforward. In most conflict contexts that is the key bone of contention. But 
more than this even in national contexts it is an open question whether or not it is legitimate to work for clients 
pursuing controversial policies (such as the CIA pursing its war on terrorism through the “Killing program”).  
40 For discussions see James Cockayne, “Commercial Security in the Humanitarian Space,” International Peace 
Academy  (2006), http://www.ipacademy.org/pdfs/COMMERCIAL_SECURITY_FINAL.pdf, Christopher 
Spearin, “What Manely Missed: The Human Security Implications of Private Security in Afghanistan,” The 
Human Security Bulletin 6, no. 3 (2008), Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen, and Finn Stepputat, eds., The Security-
Development Nexus (Capetown: HSRC Press, 2007), James R. Coleman, “Constraining Modern Mercenarism,” 
Hastings Law Journal 55, no. June (2004). respectively. 
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Conclusion 
This paper departed from the general observation that when commodities are contested and 
commodification regimes incomplete as is the case with private security this has some rather 
general and tangible consequences for market practices: it induces market practices 
minimizing the salience of contestation and obfuscating practices figure centrally on the 
repertoire of contestation. The paper proceeded to flesh out this general insight with reference 
to the notion of private security. The paper suggested that the three key articulations of the 
contestation of security privatization (around the importance of the state monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force, around the significance of national control of international uses of 
force and around the necessity to limit spirals of insecurity), have shaped the market 
practices: it has lead to practices that are marked by a high degree of public controls and 
public private enmeshment, that are located as in the realm of security and peace and that are 
defined as being about selling security obfuscating threats.  
This matters for the conceptualizations of private security, in general and more 
specifically for the current thrust to draw limits around markets and to define inherent state 
tasks. Conceptualizations should help us conceive of things, that is to help us understand and 
capture them. The reason we care about “conceptualization” is that, if ill conceived, it may do 
the opposite: obscure rather than enlighten. This often (and understandably) often happens 
with conceptualizations of private security as they (logically) rest on the key distinctions that 
mark and shape contemporary political and social thinking: the distinctions between public 
/private, between inside/outside and between security/insecure. Most conceptualizations 
indeed focus on private security quite literally that is they assume that is private (not public), 
internal (not external) and about security (not threat construction). Yet, if the argument in this 
paper holds sway this is inadequate. Because the commodification of security is contested 
market practices have been organized so that the private is in the public, the outside is in the 
inside and the insecure is in the secure. This has to be integral to the conceptualization of 
private security if the conceptualization is not to hide more than it reveals about market 
practices; something which is a precondition for regulation effective boundary drawing and 
definitions of inherent state tasks. The conceptualization in other words has to be conceived 
of as spanning the conventional divides of the public/private, the inside/outside and the 
17 
 
secure/insecure. (Shifting the terminology away from “private security” to commodification 
or commercialization of security may make this easier.41
  
) 
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